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Abstract
We provide a simple framework to analyze the effect of firm dom-
inance on incentives for R&D. An increase in firm dominance, which
we measure by a premium in consumer valuation, increases the domi-
nant firm’s incentives and decreases the rival firm’s incentives for R&D.
These changes influence the probability of innovation through two ef-
fects: changes in total R&D effort and changes in how this total is
distributed between the two firms.
For a given level of total research effort, the shift from the rival firm
to the dominant firm is a good thing as it decreases the likelihood of
duplicate innovation (we call this the duplication effect). However, the
shift in research effort is not one-to-one. The dominant firm’s benefit
from increased dominance is more inframarginal than marginal when
compared to the rival firm’s disincentive. As a result, total research
effort decreases when firm dominance increases (we call this the total
effort effect).
We show the total effort effect dominates the duplication effect when
intellectual property protection is weak, and the opposite when property
rights are strong. That is, firm dominance is good for innovation when
(but only when) property rights are strong. We also examine consumer
and social surplus.
∗lcabral@stern.nyu.edu and ben.polak@yale.edu. We thank Pedro Mar´ın and seminar
audiences at Penn and the CEPR Workshop in Applied Industrial Organization for useful
comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 Introduction
Few issues have polarized public opinion as much as the Microsoft antitrust
trial. Those siding with Microsoft argue that Microsoft is a victim of its own
success:
In the pending actions against Microsoft, Microsoft is accused of
improving their products in such a way that they force out their
competition . . . But isn’t improving their products just what we
want companies to do? Isn’t offering consumers more for less
money . . . the sort of behavior we would expect from a competitive
firm? (FreeMarket.net, undated)
A criticism of this view is that Microsoft is not really creating value but
rather appropriating value:
Microsoft has rarely been the innovator . . . Excel, the Microsoft
spreadsheet, is an imitation of Lotus 123, which was in turn an imi-
tation of VisiCalc . . . Microsoft Word was introduced into the mar-
ket long after several other popular word processors. Microsoft’s
Power Point imitated programs such as Harvard Graphics or Free-
lance, and Microsoft used acquisitions to buy itself into the rela-
tional database market, where it was a late entrant. (Nader and
Love, 1997)1
One critic goes to the extreme of describing Microsoft’s strategy as “Copy
and Conquer” (Kostura, undated). In terms of consumer and social welfare,
the problem with this is that it may reduce the incentives for rival firms to
innovate in the applications software market. The previous quote continues as
follows:
While Microsoft was typically late for the dance, it rarely left
empty-handed. Today, Microsoft so completely dominates each
of these markets that few venture capitalists would even consider
funding new programs that would seek to dislodge it. Microsoft
is not only successful, it seems unbeatable in the PC applications
markets. (Nader and Love, 1997)
1See also “Not Invented Here” (available at http://www.vcnet.com/bms/departments/
notinvented.html).
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Notwithstanding the abundance of opinions from the popular press, there
has been relatively little economics research on the welfare effects of firm dom-
inance in R&D intensive industries. As Economides (2001) put it,
on the issue of innovation, economists’ opinions are split on whether
monopoly or competition would create more innovation. Economists’
opinions are also split on whether vertically integrated or indepen-
dent companies create more innovation.
Our purpose in this paper is to provide a simple framework with which to
analyze the impact of firm dominance on incentives for R&D. We consider a
model where two firms invest in R&D with the goal of finding a product of
higher quality. Specifically, we consider a two-stage model comprising R&D
competition and then price competition. Our model has three important fea-
tures. First, we assume that property rights are imperfect, so that a lagging
firm can (imperfectly) imitate the leader. Second, firms’ R&D levels are substi-
tutes from a social point of view and strategic substitutes from a firm point of
view. Third, we assume that one of the firms is dominant, in the sense that, ev-
erything else constant, its product is worth more in the eyes of consumers. For
example, by controlling the operating system and other applications, Microsoft
is better able to integrate each piece in the whole PC/Windows platform in a
way that adds value to its applications.2
While we are ultimately interested in the welfare effects of firm dominance,
we start by looking at the effects of firm dominance on the probability of
innovation (Section 3). An increase in firm dominance, which we measure by
a premium in consumer valuation, increases the dominant firm’s incentives
and decreases the rival firm’s incentives for R&D. These changes influence the
probability of innovation through two effects: changes in total R&D effort by
the two firms and changes in how this total is distributed between the two
firms.
For a given total level of research effort, the shift in research effort from the
rival firm to the dominant firm is a good thing as it decreases the likelihood of
duplicate innovation: in the limit, it is better to have one firm innovating with
probability r than two firms innovating with probability r/2 each. However,
the shift in research effort is not one-to-one. The dominant firm’s benefit from
increased dominance is more inframarginal than marginal when compared to
2In the words of Jim Allchin, Senior Microsoft Vice President,“innovation through
integration is the engine that drives the computer industry, bringing the benefits of
computing to hundreds of millions of people.” See http://www.actonline.org/pubs
/hostage/hostage101.asp January 27, 1999.
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the rival firm’s disincentive. As a result, total research effort decreases when
firm dominance increases.
Which of the two effects dominates depends on the degree of property
rights, which we model by an imitation lag. When the imitation lag is high
(strong property rights), the equilibrium levels of research are high. We show
this implies that the total effort effect is low, whereas the duplication effect is
high. As a result, the probability of innovation increases with firm dominance.
When imitation lags are low (weak property rights), the equilibrium levels
of research are low. This implies that the duplication effect is negligible,
whereas the total effort effect is high. As a result, the probability of innovation
decreases with firm dominance.
These effects on the probability of innovation carry over to consumer and
social surplus (Sections 4 and 5). In fact, if the gains from innovation are
sufficiently high, then consumer and social surplus increase if and only if the
probability of innovation increases. However, there are cases when the prob-
ability of innovation increases but consumer surplus does not. The reason
is that firm dominance implies a lower probability of duplication. Reducing
duplication is good in terms of probability of innovation but bad from the con-
sumers’ point of view (a second innovator increases consumer surplus through
price competition). There are also cases when the probability of innovation
does not increase but social surplus does. The reason is that firm dominance
has a positive direct effect on social value, in addition to the indirect effect
through changes in the probability of innovation.
There is a recent related literature looking at R&D incentives when a domi-
nant firm owns an essential component. Farrell and Katz (1999) show that the
dominant firm may have excessive incentives to invest in the complementary
component and thus squeeze out the competition. Choi and Stefanadis (2001)
argue that tying the essential and complementary components may create a
barrier to entry: it requires a firm to be successful in both markets in order to
successfully enter.3 Gilbert and Riordan (2003) show that tying leads to fore-
closure and possibly an increase in social welfare. In these papers, the focus is
on the interaction between tying decisions and the incentives to innovate. By
contrast, we focus on the effects of increased firm dominance. We abstract from
the source of the dominant firm’s advantage (or rival firm’s disadvantage), as-
suming instead that consumers are willing to pay more for the dominant firm’s
product. As in Farrell and Katz (1999), Choi and Stefanadis (2001), Gilbert
and Riordan (2003), we consider a framework with R&D decisions followed
by price competition. One important difference is that we assume uncertain
3See also McKensie’s (2000) analysis of Microsoft’s “applications barrier to entry.”
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Table 1: Timing of the model.
1. Firms simultaneously invest in R&D.
• Firms observe R&D outcome.
• Laggard imitates leader (if applicable).
2. Firm simultaneously set prices.
• Consumer chooses one of the firms and buys one unit.
R&D success and obtain a unique equilibrium. By contrast, Gilbert and Ri-
ordan (2003) consider a deterministic R&D technology and obtain multiple
equilibria, some in mixed strategies.
Also related to our paper is the literature on imitation and innovation
incentives: Gallini (1992), Cadot and Lippman (1995), Bessen and Maskin
(2000). These papers focus primarily on the effect of imitation lags on the
incentives to innovate. For example, Cadot and Lippman show that innovation
incentives may be non-monotonic on imitation lags. By contrast, our focus is
on the effects of firm dominance on innovation incentives for a given innovation
lag.
2 Model
Suppose that two firms, 0 and 1, simultaneously invest in R&D. In order to
achieve a probability of success ri a firm must pay a cost 12r
2
i . If successful
(probability ri), firm i gets a product of quality qH . If unsuccessful (probability
1−ri) firm i’s product is worth qL. Let g ≡ qH−qL be the gain from technical
progress. The success probabilities of the two firms are independent.
Consumers are willing to pay q1 for firm 1’s product and q0 + b for firm 0’s,
where qi is firm i’s quality level. That is, firm 0 has an advantage, perhaps
because it controls a complementary product such as an operating system.
After learning the value of qi, each firm has the option of imitating its rival.
By imitating firm j, firm i’s quality becomes qi = qj − l. The value of l
measures imitation lags.
Once the values of qi have been determined (including, possibly, imitation),
firms compete in prices. For simplicity, we assume there is one consumer
buying one unit from one of the firms, whichever firm maximizes the difference
between valuation and price. We normalize production costs to zero.
Throughout the paper, we make the following assumptions about the pa-
4
Table 2: Notation.
q Quality level
g Innovation gain: g ≡ qH − qL
l Imitation lag
b Firm 0’s extra value
ri Firm i’s level of R&D, i = 0, 1
Vi Firm i’s expected value, i = 0, 1
CS Consumer surplus
SS Social surplus
rameters b, l, and g.
Assumption 1 b < l < 1 < g.
The assumption that l is lower than g corresponds to imperfect protection
of intellectual property. This implies that it is optimal for a firm with a lower
interim q to imitate its rival. We therefore simplify the second stage of the
game by assuming that, in the case where only one firm is successful in R&D,
the unsuccessful firm imitates the successful one. If b > l, then firm 1 could
never be the quality leader, even if firm 1’s R&D were successful and firm 0’s
failed. If this were the case, firm 1 would not invest in R&D at all.4 The
assumption that l < 1 ensures that our equilibria are interior.5 Finally, the
assumption g > 1 reflects the idea that innovation is important.
The timing of the game, summarized in Table 1, is as follows. Table 2 lists
the model’s notation.
As usual, we solve the game backwards, beginning with the second-stage
pricing game and then solving the R&D stage. There are four possible events:
both firms’ R&D are successful, just firm 0 is successful, just firm 1 is suc-
cessful, or neither is successful. For each such event, Table 3 summarizes its
probability, the willingness of consumers to pay for each firm’s product, the
equilibrium price, each firm’s profit (gross of R&D costs), consumer surplus
and social surplus (again gross of R&D costs).
4In this case, firm 0 would also underinvest in R&D from the point of view of social
surplus maximization, but this would just be because intellectual property protection is
imperfect (l < 1 < g). There would not be any strategic effects.
5If l > 1 then there is a corner solution in which r0 = 1 and r1 = 0. If l − b > 1/ (1− b)
then there is a second corner solution in which r1 = 1 and r0 = b.
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Table 3: Consumer surplus, social surplus and firm gross profit as a function
of R&D outcome.
R&D success event
Both Firm 0 only Firm 1 only Neither
Probability r0r1 r0(1− r1) (1− r0)r1 (1− r0)(1− r1)
Prob. notation Pboth Pinc Priv Pnone
Willingness to pay 0 qL + g + b qL + g + b qL + g − l + b qL + b
Willingness to pay 1 qL + g qL + g − l qL + g qL
Price b l + b l − b b
Firm 0’s gross profit b l + b 0 b
Firm 1’s gross profit 0 0 l − b 0
Consumer Surplus qL + g qL + g − l qL + g − l + b qL
Gross Social Surplus qL + g + b qL + g + b qL + g qL + b
For example, the probability that Firm 0 is successful and Firm 1 is not
(the event in second column) is r0(1− r1). Consumers’ willingness to pay for
firm 0’s product in this event is qH + b = qL +g+ b, and so on. More generally,
equilibrium prices are as follows: the firm with higher willingness to pay sets
a price equal to the difference to the willingness to pay for the rival’s product;
the rival firm, in turn, sets price equal to zero. In equilibrium, consumers
choose the firm charging a positive price (which we designate as equilibrium
price). Consumer surplus is the difference between willingness to pay and
price for the firm with higher willingness to pay; and gross social surplus is
the willingness to pay for the firm with higher value of willingness to pay.
3 Firm Dominance and Innovation
We first solve for the equilibrium of the R&D game. Suppose initially that
the game is symmetric (b = 0). In this case, each firm only makes any profits
in the event that it is the only successful innovator. This event occurs with
probability ri (1− r−i), and the gross profit in this event is just equal to the
innovation lag l. Therefore, in the symmetric case, the marginal benefit to firm
i of research effort is (1− r−i) l. Given the quadratic costs, the marginal cost
to firm i of increasing its research effort is equal to that effort level, ri. Thus,
6
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Figure 1: Reaction curves for l = 34 , and b = 0 (solid lines), b =
1
4 (dashed
lines).
each firm’s reaction curve is linear with intercepts at ri = l when r−i = 0 and
ri = 0 when r−i = 1. This symmetric case is shown by the solid lines in Figure
1. The equilibrium is at rei = r
e
−i = r = l/ (1 + l). As one would expect, as
the innovation lag (or intellectual property protection) l increases, each firm’s
equilibrium R&D effort increases. Notice, however, that r < 12 for all l < 1.
Now consider the case where the dominant firm has an advantage b > 0.
Not surprisingly, the dominant firm’s expected profit is now larger and the
rival’s is smaller. For changes in incentives, however, the only event that
matters is that in which the dominant firm’s R&D fails and the rival firm’s
R&D succeeds (the event with probability Priv := r1 (1− r0)). This is the only
event in which the dominant firm does not produce, and hence the only event
in which it does not get an additional profit of b. It is also the only event
in which the rival firm does produce, and hence the only event in which it
suffers a reduction in profits of b. Thus, the dominant firm’s marginal benefit
of research effort is now increased to (1− r1) l+ r1b. Its reaction curve rotates
clockwise around its r1 = 0 intercept inducing higher values of r0. The rival
firm’s marginal benefit of research effort is reduced to (1− r0) (l − b). Its
reaction curve rotates anti-clockwise around its r1 = 0 intercept, inducing
lower values of r1. The new reaction curves are shown by the dotted lines in
Figure 1. The equilibrium moves to the “south-east” and is given by
re0 =
l − (l − b)2
1− (l − b)2 and r
e
1 =
(1− l) (l − b)
1− (l − b)2 .
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Figure 2: Effect of an increase in b (from 0 to l) for four values of l, 0.2, 0.4,
0.6, 0.8.
It is easily checked that the sum of the two firms R&D efforts re0 + r
e
1 is
increasing in the innovation lag l, but that this sum is still less than 1 for all
l < 1; that is, the equilibrium always lies below the second diagonal in Figure
1. The following proposition formalizes this discussion.
Proposition 1 An increase in b implies an increase in firm 0’s equilibrium
R&D effort, r0, and a decrease in firm 1’s equilibrium R&D effort, r1.
This result describes a fundamental trade-off that permeates much of the
analysis in the paper. In addition to the direct effect of firm dominance on
consumer and social surplus, we must also consider the indirect effect in the
firms’ innovation incentives. The good news is that one of the firms, the
dominant firm, has greater incentives; the bad news is that the other firm has
lower incentives.
Which of these effects dominate? That is, what is the total effect of an
increase in firm dominance, b, on the equilibrium overall probability of there
being a successful innovation, Pinnov We can see from Figure 2 that the result
depends on the size of innovation lags (or intellectual property protection) l.
The dots on the 45◦-line show equilibrium values for (r0, r1) when b = 0 at
different levels of innovation lags l. Larger innovation lags induce more R&D,
so these equilibria are further out along the 45◦-line. The thick lines show
how these equilibria change as we increase b holding l fixed. Consistent with
Proposition 2, increasing b always moves the equilibria south-east reaching the
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r1 = 0 axis when b = l. The thinner lines in the figure, concave to the origin,
represent points at which the probability of a successful innovation is equal,
iso-Pinnov curves. We can see that increasing b reduces the overall probability
of innovation when innovation lags is small, but increasing b increases the
overall probability of innovation when innovation lags are large.
To understand this result, notice that even if both firms are undertaking
R&D, it only takes one R&D success to generate an innovation. We can write
the overall probability of a success as the sum of the probabilities that each
firm’s R&D is successful minus the probability that these successes duplicate:
Pinnov = (r
e
0 + r
e
1)− re0re1
= Rtot − Pboth
where Rtot is the total research effort of the two firms and Pboth is the proba-
bility of duplication. Thus, we can divide the impact of an increase in b into
two effects: a total effort effect ∆Rtot, and a duplication effect ∆Pboth. The
following lemmas describes these effects.
Lemma 1 Total research effort Rtot is decreasing in b. This absolute size of
this effect is decreasing in l (with liml→0 dRtotdb = −1 and liml→1 dRtotdb = 0).
Lemma 2 The probability of duplicate successes Pboth is decreasing in b. The
absolute size of this effect is small when l is small (i.e., liml→0 dPbothdb = 0).
That is, the total research effort effect and the duplication effect work in
opposite directions on the probability of innovation. Formal proofs are given
in the appendix but an intuition is as follows. For total research effort, we
already know from Proposition 2 that re0 is increasing in b and r
e
1 is decreasing
in b. In both cases, the change in incentives depends on the same event, that in
which only the rival firm’s R&D succeeds. Thus, the increase in the marginal
benefit of research effort for the dominant firm as we increase b is proportional
to the rival firm’s probability of success r1. The reduction in the marginal
benefit of research effort for the rival firm as we increase b is proportional to
the dominant firm’s probability of failure (1− r0). At all equilibria, however,
the sum re0 + r
e
1 < 1; that is, the rival firm’s probability of success r
e
1 is smaller
than the dominant firm’s probability of failure (1− re0). Thus, the increase in
the marginal incentive for the dominant firm’s research effort is smaller than
the decrease in the corresponding marginal incentive for the rival firm. Hence
Rtot is decreasing in b. As l increases, however, the sum of research efforts
re0 + r
e
1 increase toward one; that is, the rival firm’s probability of success
9
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Figure 3: Illustration of Proposition 2. P denotes the probability of innovation.
re1 becomes close to the dominant firm’s probability of failure (1− re0). This
reduces the difference between the changes in the two firms marginal incentives
to R&D and hence reduces the total research effort effect.
For the duplication effect, given any fixed total research effort, if we reallo-
cate that effort away from symmetry toward just one firm, then we reduce the
probability of duplication (and hence increase the probability of innovation).
We know from Proposition 2 that increasing b shifts research effort from the
rival firm to the dominant firm. The fact (Lemma 1) that it also reduces total
effort, only reduces further the probability of duplicate successes. Hence Pboth
is decreasing in b. When l is small, however, the research efforts of both firms
are small so the probability that both firms succeed is very small; that is, the
duplication effect becomes second order.
We are now ready to state formally the effect of changes in b on the prob-
ability of innovation. Proposition 3 is concerned with small changes in the
advantage of the dominant firm.
Proposition 2 Consider a small increase in firm dominance b. There exists
a threshold l¯(b) such that the probability of innovation decreases as we raise b
if and only if the innovation lag l is smaller than l¯(b), where 0 < l¯(b) < 1 if
b ∈ (0, 1).
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 2. The curved line represents points where
dPinnov / d b = 0. To the left of this line, dPinnov / d b < 0, and to the right
dPinnov / d b > 0. A formal proof is in the appendix but the intuition follows
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directly from the lemmas above. When l is small, duplication effects are small
and the total effort effect dominates. When l is large, total effort effects are
small and the duplication effect dominates.
When b = 0, that is, around symmetry, small reallocations of effort (leaving
total effort constant) have only a second-order effect on the probability of
duplication (the iso-Pinnov curves all have slope −1 at the 45◦-line). Hence
the duplication effect is second order around b = 0. The total effort effect
dominates and dPinnov / d b < 0. In terms of Proposition 3, this means that
l¯(0) = 1.6
In addition to this local result, we are interested in how the probability of
innovation changes as we change from b = 0 to b = l. At b = 0, we are in a
symmetric duopoly. At b = l, the advantage of the dominant firm is such that
we are in an effective monopoly in which only the dominant firm undertakes
R&D.
Proposition 3 Consider an increase in b from 0 (symmetric duopoly) to b = l
(monopoly). The probability of innovation increases if and only if l >
√
5−1
2 .
The exact cut off value for l stems from the details of the model, but the
intuition is the same as before. When l is small, the total effort effect dom-
inates. When l is large, the duplication effect dominates. For example, as l
approaches 1, at monopoly (b = l), only the dominant firm undertakes R&D.
Its efforts, and hence the probability of an innovation, approach 1. At sym-
metry (b = 0), both firms are active and their R&D efforts each approach 1/2,
so the total R&D effort is the same. But now the probability of a successful
innovation is only 3/4. This is the effect of duplication.
4 Consumer Surplus
What is the effect of an increase in firm dominance b on consumer surplus?
As before, it depends on the size of the innovation lag l, but now also on the
social gains to innovations g. From Table 3, we can write consumer surplus as
CS = qL + Pbothg + Pinc (g − l) + Priv (g − l + b)
= qL + Pinnov (g − l) + Pbothl + Privb
6We can also show that l¯(1) = 1. To understand this result, notice that the rival firm’s
expected payoff is given by (l − b)(1 − r0). At l = b = 1, both terms in brackets are zero,
and so a small decrease in b has no effect on r1. The dominant firm’s expected payoff, in
turn, is given by (1− r1)l+ r1b. Since r1 = 0 and r1 does not change with b, it follows that
r0 does not change either. We conclude that dPinnov / d b = 0 at l = b = 1, as Figure 3
indicates.
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The last term is a direct effect. Consumers gain directly from the quality
improvement b but only in the event in which only the rival firm’s R&D is
successful. In that event, the advantage of the dominant firm limits the price
that the rival firm can charge. In all other events, the dominant firm wins the
sale and, though the good sold incorporates the quality improvement b, the
price fully captures this increase in quality. Thus the size of the direct effect
of an increase in b on consumer surplus depends on Priv := (1− r0) r1. We
already know from the previous section that this probability is small when l is
small and when b is large. In both these cases, the rival firm has low incentive
to undertake R&D.
In addition, increasing b has three indirect effects on consumer surplus.
First: whenever there is a successful innovation, consumers gain (at least)
the difference between the quality improvement and the innovation lag, g − l.
An immediate implication is that, if the quality gain of innovation g is large,
then consumer surplus increases if and only if the probability of innovation
increases. That is, If g is large, the qualitative results of Propositions 2 and 3
apply to consumer surplus.
When g is small or intermediate, other indirect effects can matter. Sec-
ond: from Lemma 2, we already know that increasing b decreases the prob-
ability of duplicate R&D successes, Pboth. In the last section, we were only
concerned with increasing the probability of innovation, and duplicate R&D
successes were no help. But consumers gain from duplicate successes since
increased competition reduces prices. Thus, decreasing Pboth is bad for con-
sumers. Third: we also know from the previous section that increasing b
decreases Priv, reducing consumer surplus. Since the second and third indi-
rect effects are negative, the sum of the indirect effects are negative whenever
∆Pinnov < 0, which again returns us to Propositions 2 and 3. For example,
when l is small ∆Pinnov < 0. The indirect effects on consumer surplus, how-
ever, are also negative when l is large relative to g. To see this, recall that
Pinnov = Rtot − Pboth. Thus we can write consumer surplus as
CS = Rtot (g − l)− Pboth (g − l) + Pbothl + Privb
= Rtot (g − l) + Pboth (2l − g) + Privb.
The probability of duplication appears twice. It hurts surplus (by an amount
equal to g−l) by reducing the probability of innovation, but it helps consumers
(by an amount equal to l) by increasing competition. Thus, when l > 2g
duplication is a net gain to consumers. By Lemmas 1 and 2 and Proposition
2, we know that total effort, the probability of duplication and the probability
that only the rival succeeds are all decreasing in b. Thus, if l > 2g, all indirect
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effects of changing b on consumer surplus are negative.
The following proposition combines the effects from the above discussion
for a small changes in the advantage of the dominant firm.
Proposition 4 Consider a small increase in firm dominance b. If the social
gains to innovation g are large, then consumer surplus moves in the same
direction as the probability of innovation as we raise b (see Proposition 2).
For lower values of g, consumer surplus may decrease even as the probability
of innovation increases as we raise b if both b and l are large.
As in the previous section, we are also interested in large changes in firm
dominance from symmetry (b = 0) to effective monopoly (b = l).
Proposition 5 Consider an increase in b from 0 (symmetric duopoly) to b = l
(monopoly). If the social gains to innovation g < 2, then consumer surplus
declines.
For an intuition, first notice that at both b = 0 and b = l, the term
Privb is zero. That is, the direct effects are irrelevant to this comparison.
Second, recall from Proposition 3 that, when l is large, the large reduction
in duplication as we move to effective monopoly leads to an increase in the
probability of innovation. For consumer surplus, however, duplication has both
positive and negative effects. As l approaches and then exceeds g/2, the net
negative effect of duplication first becomes small and then reverses sign. Thus,
once l is large, the reduction in duplication as we move to effective monopoly
has either a small effect and eventually a negative effect on consumer surplus.
5 Social Surplus
We now consider how changes in firm dominance affect social surplus. There
are two important differences with respect to our discussion of consumer sur-
plus. First, we now ignore how surplus is split between consumers and firms.
Second, we must now take into account the costs of R&D.
From Table 3, we can write social surplus as
SS = qL + Pboth (g + b) + Pinc(g + b) + Priv (g) + Pnoneb− c0 − c1
= qL + Pinnov (g) + (1− Priv) b− c0 − c1
where ci is the cost of firm i’s R&D efforts. Notice the contrast between
consumer and social surplus. From a social point of view, total benefit is the
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same when both firm’s innovate as when only the dominant firm innovates.
The only difference is how that surplus is split between consumers and firms.
For consumers, however, a second innovator increases competition and brings
about an extra benefit of l, as we saw in the previous section.
The contrast between consumer and social surplus is particularly drastic
with respect to the effects of b. As we saw in the previous section, consumers
only benefit from b when it is only the rival firm whose R&D succeeds. In
this case, a higher b limits the extent of the rival firm’s market power. From
a social welfare point of view, however, the opposite is true: an increase in b
benefits society in all states except that in which only the rival firm’s R&D
succeeds.
When we change b, as before, we get direct and indirect effects. The direct
effect is (1− Priv) and it is always positive. As before, the indirect effects work
through r0 increasing and r1 decreasing. Increasing firm 0’s R&D effort moves
probability from the event that neither firm succeeds to the event that only
firm 0 succeeds, and moves probability from the event that only firm 1 succeeds
to the event that both succeed. It also increases costs. Thus, marginal net
social benefit through changes in r0 is given by
(1− r1) g + r1 b− c′0
where c′0 represents marginal costs. Compare this with the marginal net private
benefit of increasing r0 to firm 0 (from section 3):
(1− r1) l + r1 b− c′0.
The difference between these terms is just (1− r1) (g − l): the difference be-
tween the public and private gains when firm 0 is the only innovator. But in
equilibrium, we know that this marginal net private benefit is zero (this is the
envelope theorem). Thus, the net marginal social benefit is just (1− r1) (g−l).
Similarly, increasing firm 1’s R&D effort moves probability from the event
that only firm 1 succeeds to the event that neither firm succeeds, and moves
probability from the event that both succeed to the event that only firm 0
succeeds, and also affects costs. Thus, the marginal net social benefit through
changes in r1 is given by
(1− r0) (g − b)− c′1
while the marginal net private benefit is given by
(1− r0) (l − b)− c′1.
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Again, the difference is just (1− r0) (g − l): the difference between the public
and private gains when firm 1 is the only innovator. And again, in equilibrium,
we know that the marginal net private benefit is zero. Thus, the net marginal
social benefit is just (1− r0) (g − l).
Putting this together, we find that the total indirect marginal effect of
increasing b on social surplus is given by
(g − l)
(
(1− r1) d r0
d b
+ (1− r0) d r0
d b
)
= (g − l) dP innov
d b
.
Recall that the direct effects are positive. Thus, for small increases in b, social
surplus is increasing in b whenever the probability of innovation is increasing
in b; for example, when the innovation lag l is large. As the innovation lag
l approaches zero, the weight (1− Priv) on the direct effect converges to one:
it is almost never the case that the rival firm innovates. On the other hand,
since dP innov
db
= dRtot
db
− dPboth
db
, we know from our lemmas that the indirect
effect converges to −g. Thus, for very small innovation lags (like innovation
and consumer surplus), social surplus is decreasing in b. To summarize.
Proposition 6 Consider a small increase in firm dominance b. If the social
gains to innovation g are large, then consumer surplus moves in the same
direction as the probability of innovation as we raise b (see Proposition 2).
Even if g is small, if the probability of innovation is increased as we raise b,
then so is social surplus.
Once again, we are also interested in large changes in firm dominance from
symmetry (b = 0) to effective monopoly (b = l). For social surplus, these
mirror the local results.
Proposition 7 Consider an increase in b from 0 (symmetric duopoly) to b = l
(monopoly). If the probability of innovation is increased as we raise b, then so
is social surplus.
6 Summary and extensions
Table 4 summarizes the main results in the paper. First, we have shown
that an increase in firm dominance b increases the probability of innovation if
and only if imitation lags l are large. Second, if the gains from innovation are
sufficiently large, then the effects on consumer and social surplus have the same
sign as the effects on the probability of innovation. Third, an increase in b has
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Table 4: Summary of main results.
Small Change
change from b = 0
in b to b = l
Probability +ve iff l > l¯(b) +ve iff l >
√
5−1
2
of innovation
Consumer ∝ prob. innovation if g large
surplus −ve if small g, large b, l −ve if g < 2
Social ∝ prob. innovation if g large
surplus
+ve if ∆Pinnov +ve
Note: +ve=positive; −ve=negative; ∝= proportional to.
a positive direct effect on social surplus, and so an increase in the probability
of innovation is a sufficient condition for an increase in social surplus. Finally,
an increase in b may have a negative effect on consumer surplus through a
decrease in the probability of duplication, which in turn may lead to a decrease
in consumer surplus even when the probability of innovation increases.
One important extension of our model concerns the nature of firm domi-
nance. While most agree that Microsoft has a competitive advantage over ri-
vals, there is wide disagreement as to what the source of such advantage is. In
the previous sections, we have assumed that firm 0, the dominant firm, is able
to add value to its product. For example, in the Introduction we mentioned
that, by controlling the operating system and other applications, Microsoft is
better able to integrate each piece in the whole PC/Windows platform. But
Microsoft may also prevent rival firms from integrating their software with
the Windows operating system, thereby reducing the rival firm’s value.7 In
practice, it may be relatively easy to see that a firm is dominant but, in the
absence of a smoking gun, it may be very hard to distinguish whether the
dominant firm is adding value to its own product or reducing the value of its
7“Microsoft has . . . engaged in practices which are often described as . . . anti-
competitive, such as the continual manipulation of the proprietary operating system to
undermine rival’s products, selective dissemination of information regarding the operating
system’s current and future functionality, . . . pre-announcements of non-existent products
to discourage consumer purchases of rival goods (sometimes referred to as “vaporware”)”
(Nader and Love, 1997).
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Table 5: Consumer surplus, social surplus and firm gross profit as a function
of R&D outcome.
R&D success event
Both Firm 0 only Firm 1 only Neither
Probability r0r1 r0(1− r1) (1− r0)r1 (1− r0)(1− r1)
Willingness to pay 0 qL + g qL + g qL + g − l qL
Willingness to pay 1 qL + g − d qL + g − l − d qL + g − d qL − d
Price d l + d l − d d
Firm 0’s gross profit d l + d 0 d
Firm 1’s gross profit 0 0 l − d 0
Consumer Surplus qL + g − d qL + g − l − d qL + g − l qL − d
Gross Social Surplus qL + g qL + g qL + g − d qL
rival’s product. It is therefore useful to know which of our results are robust
to the nature of firm dominance.
To model the idea of reducing rival’s value, we set b = 0 and assume a
negative premium d on the rival’s value. reducing the willingness to pay for the
rival firm’s product by d. Table 5 is then the analog of Table 3. An immediate
observation is that each firm’s profits (and hence its marginal incentive to
undertake R&D) are the same as before except that d has replaced b. In
particular, this means that all our results from Section 3 about the probability
of innovation still hold. For example, we learned in Section 3 that increasing
firm dominance increases the probability of innovation if the innovation lag l is
large, and reduces the probability of innovation if the innovation lag is small.
This result still applies.
Corollary 1 If the dominant firm advantage comes in the form of a reduction
−d in its rival’s product value, then equilibrium R&D effort levels of the two
firms are exactly as if the advantage came in the form of an increase b in
the dominant firm’s product value. Hence the comparative statics results of
Propositions 2 and 3, and Lemmas 1 and 2 still apply (with b = d).
Just as before, if the gains to innovation g are large then the effect of
increasing firm dominance on both consumer and social surplus follow the
effect on the probability of innovation. Thus, for example, if g is large, even
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when firm dominance is achieved by reducing a rival’s value, such a reduction
still increases social and consumer surplus when the innovation lag l is large.
When g is relatively small, however, we get different welfare effects of
increasing dominance if dominance is in the form of reducing rival’s value.
Analogously to Section 4, we can write consumer surplus as
CS = qL + Pinnov (g − l) + Pbothl − (1− Priv) d
As before, the last term is a direct effect, but now it is negative. Moreover
(using the fact that comparative statics are unchanged from Section 3) the term
−(1 − Priv) d is decreasing as we increase d. The probability of duplication,
Pboth, is also decreasing in firm dominance. Thus, whenever increasing firm
dominance d reduces the probability of innovation, it also reduces consumer
surplus. Also as before, we can also write consumer surplus as
CS = qL + Rtot (g − l) + Pboth (2l − g)− (1− Priv) d
Thus, if g < 2l, increasing firm dominance d always reduces consumer surplus.
Moving to social surplus, analogously to before, we can write social surplus
as
SS = qL + Pinnov g − Priv d− c0 − c1
Once again, we can divide the effect of increasing d into direct and indirect
effects. The direct effect, −Priv, is negative. As in Section 5, we can reduce
the indirect effects to
(g − l) dPinnov
d d
Thus, whenever innovation is decreased by raising d, social surplus is also. To
summarize:
Corollary 2 If g is large, then (as before) consumer and social surplus move
in the same direction as the probability of innovation as we raise d. If g is
relatively small and the probability of innovation decreases as we raise d, then
so do both consumer and social surplus. If g < 2l then increasing d always
reduces consumer surplus.
It is not a surprise that reducing a rival value has worse welfare effects
than increasing the dominant firm’s value. What is perhaps more surprising
is that the qualitative effects are so similar. In other words, our results are
surprisingly robust with respect the nature of firm dominance.
Another robustness test is the nature of product market competition. We
have assumed price competition with vertical differentiation only. While this
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implies profit functions that are not smooth (at the point where rivals have
equal valuations), we believe our results are not knife-edged and would hold
with some degree of horizontal product differentiation. The important feature
is that the gap between dominant firm and rival firm in terms of marginal
incentive for research effort increases as the value of b increases.
Our assumption of a quadratic cost function is made for analytical conve-
nience. It is clear from the proofs that our qualitative results do not depend
on the exact functional form. Finally, we consider the case of one rival firm
only. We believe the main results and intuitions would extend to the n case
as well.
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Appendix: proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Solving for the Nash equilibrium, we get
re0 =
l − (l − b)2
1− (l − b)2
re1 =
(1− l)(l − b)
1− (l − b)2 .
Straightforward differentiation implies that
d re0
d b
= 2
(1− l)(l − b)
(1− (l − b)2)2
d re1
d b
= −(1− l)(1 + (l − b)
2)
(1− (l − b)2)2 ,
The result then follows from Assumption 1.
Proof of Lemma 1: As seen before, the best-response functions are given
by
r∗0 = l − (l − b)r1
r∗1 = (l − b)(1− r0).
Summing and differentiating (at the equilibrium values) yields
(
dre0
db
+
dre1
db
)
= − (l − b)
(
dre0
db
+
dre1
db
)
+ re1 − (1− re0)(
dre0
dl
+
dre1
dl
)
= − (l − b)
(
dre0
dl
+
dre1
dl
)
+ (1− re1) + (1− re0)
Rearranging the top expression, we get
(1 + l − b)
(
d re0
d b
+
d re1
d b
)
= −(1− re0 − re1). (1)
Since r0+r1 < 1, the right-hand side is negative, and the first part of the result
follows: ∂ Rtot / ∂ b < 0 . Regarding the second part of the result, notice that
l = 1 and b > 0 implies r0 = 1, r1 = 0, so the right-hand side of (1) is zero.
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Rearranging the bottom expression yields(
dre0
dl
+
dre1
dl
)
(1 + l − b) = (1− re1) + (1− re0) .
Thus, total effort is increasing in l. Taking the cross derivative, we get(
d2re0
dbdl
+
d2re1
dbdl
)
= − (l − b)
(
d2re0
dbdl
+
d2re1
dbdl
)
−
(
dre0
db
+
dre1
db
)
+
(
dre0
dl
+
dre1
dl
)
or (
d2re0
dbdl
+
d2re1
dbdl
)
(1 + l − b) = dRtot
dl
− dRtot
db
> 0
For the limits, as l → 1, if b = 0, re0 = re1 → 12 . If 0 < b < l, then re0 → 1
and re1 → 0. In either case, (re1 + re0) → 1 and hence dRtotdb → 0. As l→ 0 (with
b < l), (re1 + r
e
0) → 0 and hence dRtotdb → −1.
Proof of Lemma 2: Differentiating Pboth we get
d (re0.r
e
1)
db
= re1
dre0
db
+ re0
dre1
db
= re1
(
dre0
db
+
dre1
db
)
+ (re0 − re1)
(
dre1
db
)
The first term is negative since total effort is decreasing (Lemma 1). The
second term is non-positive since re1 is decreasing and r
e
0 ≥ re1 (Proposition 1).
For the limit, as l → 0, both re1 → 0 and re0 → 0, so it is enough to show that
neither of the derivatives dr
e
0
db
or dr
e
1
db
explode as l → 0. This is easily checked
by inspection of the equilibrium expressions.
Proof of Proposition 2: Computation establishes that
dPinnov
db
∣∣∣∣∣
b=0
= − 1− l
(1 + l)3
< 0
dPinnov
db
∣∣∣∣∣
b=l
= −(1− l)2 < 0.
Moreover, solving dPinnov
db
= 0 with respect to l yields only two real roots: l = 1
and
l = l¯(b) = 1− 3
√
b(2− b)2 + 3
√
b2(2− b)
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Notice that l¯(0) = l¯(1) = 1 and l¯(b) < 1 for b ∈ (0, 1). By Lemmas 1 and 2
we know that dPinnov
db
< 0 when l is close to zero. Since dPinnov
db
is continuous in
l, b, we conclude that dPinnov
db
< 0 if and only if l < l¯(b).
Proof of Proposition 3: At b = 0, the equilibrium is symmetric with
re0 = r
e
1 = r = l/ (1 + l). Thus, Pinnov| b=0 = 1− (1− r)2 = 1− 1/ (1 + l)2. At
b = l, only the dominant firm is active and r0 = l. Thus, Pinnov| b=l = l. The
result follows by direct calculation.
Proof of Proposition 4: Consumer surplus may be written as
CS = qL + Pboth g + Pinc (g − l) + Priv (g − l + b)
= qL + Pinnov (g − l) + Pboth l + Priv b
If g is large enough, then dCS e / d b > 0 if and only if dPinnov / d b > 0. This
proves the first part of the proposition.
Computing the derivative of CS e with respect to b and equating b to zero
we get
dCS e
d b
∣∣∣∣∣
b=0
=
2l − l2(1− l)− g(1− l)
(1 + l)3
.
Immediate inspection reveals that the derivative ranges from −g < 0 for l = 0
to 2 > 0 for l = 1. Moreover, the derivative of the numerator with respect to l
is given by 3l2 + 2(1− l) + g, which is positive under Assumption 1. It follows
that, for small values of b, there exists an l¯(b) such that consumer surplus is
decreasing in b if and only if l < l¯(b).
Consider now the case when b = l. Computation establishes that
dCS e
d b
∣∣∣∣∣
b=l
= −(1− l)
(
g(1− l) + l2
)
< 0.
Together with the previous result, this implies that for high values of l, con-
sumer surplus is maximal for an intermediate value of b.
Proof of Proposition 5: Straightforward computation yields
CS | b=l = qL + (g − l)l
CS | b=0 =
l
(
gl + 2(g − l)
)
(1 + l)2
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We now show that, given l < g < 2, we have CS | b=0 > CS | b=l. If fact, if
l2 + l − 1 > 0 then
CS | b=0 − CS | b=l =
l
(
l(l2 + 2l − 1)− g(l2 + l − 1)
)
(1 + l)2
>
l
(
l(l2 + 2l − 1)− 2(l2 + l − 1)
)
(1 + l)2
=
l(1− l)2(2 + l)
(1 + l)2
> 0.
On the other hand, if l2 + l − 1 < 0 then
CS | b=0 − CS | b=l =
l
(
l(l2 + 2l − 1)− g(l2 + l − 1)
)
(1 + l)2
>
l
(
l(l2 + 2l − 1)− l(l2 + l − 1)
)
(1 + l)2
=
l3
(1 + l)2
> 0.
which concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6: In text.
Proof of Proposition 7: Recall that social surplus is given by SS = qL +
Pinnov (g) + (1− Priv) b− c0 − c1. At b = 0, this reduces to
SS | b=0 = qL + Pinnov| b=0 (g)− r2
where r is the symmetric equilibrium R&D effort level l/ (1 + l). At b = l,
social surplus reduces to
SS| b=l = qL + Pinnov| b=l (g) + b− 12 l
2
= qL + Pinnov| b=l (g) + l − l
2
2
Thus, SS | b=l − SS b=0 > Pinnov| b=l − Pinnov| b=0.
For small l, SS | b=l > SS b=0 if and only if d SS / d b > 0. The second part
of the proposition thus follows from Proposition 6.
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